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PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER v. ROBINS:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
LAWRENCE M. COHEN*
The United States Supreme Court's decision last term in Prune-
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins' represents the latest tack in the zigzag
path taken by the Court in seeking to reconcile conflicting free speech
and private property claims. Since 1968, in numerous varied situa-
tions,2 the Court has sought to chart this heretofore largely unexplored
area. Unfortunately, despite this repeated examination, the waters re-
main murky and the future course far from certain. To explore both
the wisdom of the new direction now suggested by PruneYard, and the
potential resolution of the questions left unanswered by that opinion,
this article will first examine PruneYard's past and present.
PRUNEYARD'S PAST: BRAVE NEW WORLDS
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
In 1968, after a silence of more than twenty years, 3 the Court again
addressed the question of whether private property may, for first
amendment purposes, be considered the same as public property. Re-
entering these troubled seas in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Val-
ley Plaza, Inc. ,4 the Court recognized that the nation was doing busi-
ness at a new location.5 Retail establishments had been transformed
from individual urban free-standing stores into clusters of stores dis-
* B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, IIT/Chicago Kent College of Law. Mr. Cohen is a partner in the Chicago law firm
Fox and Grove and was counsel for the property owners in the Taggart, Hudgens, Sears and
Diamond cases and represented amici on behalf of the property owners in the Logan Valley,
Lloyd and PruneYard cases. The author expresses his appreciation for the assistance Martin K.
Denis rendered in the preparation of this article.
1. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 445 U.S. 972 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
3. Although the issue had arisen under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
169 (see, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)), the last previous occasion
that the Court had reached the constitutional issue was in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
4. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
5. Id. at 324.
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persed in many different configurations6 over a broad geographic area.
Manufacturing facilities had similarly emigrated from the cities to sub-
urban industrial parks, while many service operations had moved into
multi-story office complexes. 7
Radical alterations had also affected those groups who desired to
deliver a message to the customers, employees or owners of such busi-
nesses. Those groups had expanded to include not only the "workers
seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers pro-
testing shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority groups seeking
nondiscriminatory hiring policies" noted in Logan Valley, 8 but those
seeking to propagate an infinite variety of other political, social, reli-
gious, commercial, charitable and economic ideas.9 These groups en-
countered a serious logistical problem: they had to overcome the
cordon sanitaire of parking lots, open areas and lobbies surrounding
the object of their proposed communication. If private property rights
prevailed over first amendment rights in this contested space, free com-
munication would be greatly impeded and the impact of the desired
message would be seriously diluted. The result was a new attack on the
bastions of private property. The initial skirmish was Logan Valley.
6. These configurations may all be commonly referred to as "shopping centers"; that term
can be "applied to any number and variety of merchandising and service operations... because
there is no legally acceptable definition of the phrase 'shopping center.'" Freeman v. Retail
Clerks Local 1207, 45 L.R.R.M. 2334, 2337 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd onpre-emption grounds,
58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961). Shopping centers have ranged, for example, from the small
strip center involved in Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970), a single retail store
containing a supermarket and a small drug department, all owned and operated by the same
company, with adjacent parking spaces for two rows of automobiles, to the large regional center
involved in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), which embraced approximately 50 acres,
accommodated more than 1000 automobiles and had a perimeter of almost one and one-half
miles.
7. There was also a corresponding increase in the variety of public forums which similarly
became the situs for the exercise of first amendment activities. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348 (1980) (military base); Jones v. North Carolina Prison Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (prison); City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(high school classroom); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (public streets); Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge School Bd., 578 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1978) (school gymna-
sium); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (state capitol grounds); Wright v. Chief of
Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977) (subway system); Sellers v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970) (university building); Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel,
420 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (national park); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (univer-
sity football field); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (bus terminal).
8. 391 U.S. at 324.
9. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (high school stu-
dents seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution); Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 445 U.S. 972 (1980) (environmental organization); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (serviceman protesting the Air Force's grooming standards); Jones v.
North Carolina Prison Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (inmates soliciting membership in their labor
union); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political candidates).
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The confronting parties in Logan Valley were a union protesting
nonunion wages and the object of that protest, a supermarket located in
a small shopping center. '0 After the union commenced area standards
protest picketing on the shopping center's property, the owners of the
center and the supermarket obtained a state court injunction, subse-
quently affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, enjoining the
picketing as a trespass. I"
The United States Supreme Court could have resolved the conflict
by deciding either that the case was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Act' 2 or, as advocated by Justice Harlan,
that since this determination was precluded because of the union's fail-
ure to argue pre-emption in the lower courts, the case was simply "not
an appropriate one for [the] Court to decide."' 3 Instead, the Court em-
barked on what was to be an eight-year odyssey into an unchartered
area of constitutional rights. Justice Marshall, on behalf of five mem-
bers of the Court, concluded that the situs at issue was essentially indis-
tinguishable for first amendment purposes from the company town in
Marsh v. Alabama;'4 that because the Logan Valley shopping center
was generally open to the public and functioned the same as the Marsh
company town business district, the state could not exclude "those
members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment
rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally conso-
nant with the use to which the property is actually put."'15 The lower
court's restriction of the pickets to a location outside the shopping
center was held to impermissibly "substantially hinder" communica-
tion of the union's message, particularly in the absence of any showing
that the picketing "was significantly interfering with the use to which
the mall property was being put by both respondents and the general
10. Although the Court described Logan Valley Plaza as a "large ... shopping center com-
plex," at the time the critical events in the case occurred only two tenants had moved into the
center: the supermarket (Weis Markets) and a Sears, Roebuck & Co. store. 391 U.S. at 310.
I1. Id. at 313.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Labor Act]. The majority
opinion observed that, while the petitioners had made such an argument and had also contended
that their picketing was protected by section 7 of the Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), "[blecause
of our disposition of the case, we do not reach either contention." 391 U.S. at 309 n. 1. Justice
Black, dissenting, similarly did not reach any issue under the Labor Act. Id. at 329 n.3. The
Court's refusal to initially address the pre-emption question, before determining whether the pick-
eting was protected by the first amendment, was criticized by Justice Harlan who correctly
prophesied that not only would a pre-emption resolution "avoid interpretation of the Constitution
itself. . . [it] would also assure that the Court does not itself disrupt the statutory scheme of labor
law established by the Congress .... " Id. at 333 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13. 391 U.S. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
15. 391 U.S. at 319-20.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
public."' 6 In contrast to "a situation involving a person's home," 17 the
majority found that "no meaningful claim to protection of a right of
privacy can be advanced" nor could the property owners make "any
significant claim to protection of the normal business operation." Ac-
cordingly, the conflict was reduced to a clash between first amendment
rights and the right of "naked title," the latter providing no more sup-
port for the property owners in Logan Valley than it did for the owners
of the company town in Marsh. 18
The majority's reliance on Marsh was sharply criticized by the au-
thor of that opinion, Justice Black. In a vigorous dissent, he argued
that, in the absence of the Marsh factual situation where the property
involved had "taken on all the attributes of a town," there was "noth-
ing in Marsh which. . .[permits] the Court to confiscate a part of an
owner's private property and give its use to people who want to picket
on it. . . . To hold that store owners are compelled by law to supply
picketing areas for pickets to drive store customers away is to create a
court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which
private ownership of property rests in this country."' 19 In a separate
dissent, Justice White predicted two far reaching ramifications of the
majority's views: first, that the Marsh "business district" rationale
could also be used to "compel the shopping center to permit picketing
on its property for other communicative purposes, whether the subject
matter concerned a particular business establishment or not," and, sec-
ond, that "it is not clear how the Court might draw a line between
'shopping centers' and other business establishments which have side-
16. Id. at 323. The interference referred to by the Court was that which traditionally has
been invoked to permit regulation, albeit not prohibition, of union picketing, i:e., mass picketing,
the blocking of ingress or egress, and threats of or actual incidents of violence. The union in
Logan Valley did not contest these portions of the injunction. Id. at 312 n.4, 323 n. 13. See also id.
at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. The "situation involving a person's home" has not, however, escaped controversy. In
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), the Court overturned an injunction
prohibiting handbilling in the residential community in which an alleged "blockbuster" resided
on the ground that it contravened the first amendment. Ordinances prohibiting certain door-to-
door solicitation of contributions and the picketing of residences other than peaceful picketing of a
place of employment involved in a labor dispute were recently held unconstitutional in Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) and Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980). See also the post-PruneYard decision of the California Court of Appeal in
Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden West Publishing Corp., 80 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2513, 2515
(Cal. C.A. 4th, Sept. 4, 1980), holding that if the owners of a private residential community "admit
a representative of a given category of activity for purposes of exercising the constitutional right of
free speech [e.g., an unsolicited, give-away commercial newspaper], then others of the same cate-
gory [e.g., distributions of other similar newspapers] cannot be excluded from the exercise of that
same right."
18. 391 U.S. at 324-25.
19. Id. at 332-33 (Black, J., dissenting).
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walks or parking on their own property." 20
Both of Justice White's concerns-the extension of Logan Valley
to other private forums and to the communication of unrelated
messages-were soon to be tested. The former issue was presented to
the Court two years later in Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc.2 1 The situs of
the union picketing there was a narrow sidewalk adjacent to what
could only loosely be considered a "shopping center," 22 physical cir-
cumstances which led the state courts to conclude that the picketing
could be enjoined as obstructive. Subsequently, however, the operation
of the businesses changed and that fact, coupled with the "obscure rec-
ord" and the small remaining "embers of controversy," resulted in the
Supreme Court dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. Although the Court did not determine, therefore, whether
there was a first amendment right to picket on the particular property
at issue, it did suggest that there were at least some private physical
surroundings where, notwithstanding that they were generally open to
the public and functioned as business districts similar to the Logan Val-
ley Plaza, the exercise of first amendment rights could nevertheless be
prohibited. 23
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner
Justice White's second concern in Logan Valley, the applicability
of that case to the situation where the message was unrelated to the
shopping center or its tenants, came before the Court in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner.24 Lloyd Center was an extensive regional shopping center, vir-
20. Id. at 339 (White, J., dissenting).
21. 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
22. See note 6 supra.
23. 397 U.S. at 225. The Court added that had it addressed the first amendment legitimacy
of the picketing in Taggart, that issue would have "come down to whether, in light of the physical
circumstances of this narrow sidewalk at the store entrance,. . . [the picketing] 'will unduly inter-
fere with the normal use of the. . . property by other members of the public with an equal right
of access to it.' " 397 U.S. at 225. Additionally, both the AFL-CIO, Brief as amicus curiae at 14,
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970), as well as the NLRB, Brief as amicus curiae at
17, Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 223 (1970), conceded that
picketing or handbilling inside the store would be properly enjoinable.
Taggart also previewed the Labor Act pre-emption dispute, left unresolved in Logan Valley,
see note I I supra, that the Court later decided in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). Justice Harlan again urged that the state courts
should be foreclosed from enjoining the picketing under the pre-emption principles of San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 397 U.S. at 229-31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger disagreed: "In my view any contention that the States are pre-empted in the
circumstances is without merit. . . . Nothing in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
• . . would warrant this Court to declare state-law trespass remedies to be ineffective. . . redress
for illegal trespassory picketing." Id. at 227-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
24. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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tually the diametric opposite of the situs of the Taggart dispute.25 In
contrast to the union picketing directed at the Logan Valley and Tag-
gart tenants, however, the handbilling involved in Lloyd concerned an
unrelated subject, the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the district court
and the Ninth Circuit found Logan Valley controlling.
In a five-to-four opinion, a substantially reconstituted Supreme
Court26 reversed. Justice Powell's majority opinion, moreover, did not
simply utilize the unrelated nature of the Lloyd message to differentiate
Logan Valley. Instead, although the rationale of the majority could
have been amply predicated upon either the absence of a relationship
"between the purpose of the expressive activity and the business of the
shopping center, '' 27 or even upon the broader Logan Valley distinction
that the pickets there "would have been deprived of all reasonable op-
portunity to convey the message . . . had they been denied access to
the shopping center," 28 the Court went considerably further. It inter-
laced its opinion with a skepticism as to the applicability, in any case,
of the "business district-openness to the public" thesis of Logan Val-
ley.29 The Court recognized that the property owner's rights far ex-
25. See note 6 supra.
26. Only four of the six majority and concurring Justices in Logan Valley were still on the
Court at the time of Lloyd. These Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Douglas and Stewart) constituted
the Lloyd dissent. The Lloyd majority consisted of Logan Valley dissenter Justice White and four
newly appointed Justices (Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger). The dissent
suggested that this "radical change" in the composition of the Court and the corollary displeasure
of the new members with "Logan Valley itself' was responsible for the different result between
Logan Valley and Lloyd. 407 U.S. at 584 (dissenting opinion). In addition, only eight months
before certiorari was granted in Lloyd, but prior to the appointment of Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist, the Court had denied review of a virtually identical dispute. See Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal.
3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
27. 407 U.S. at 564. The Court had previously commented that Logan Valley "was carefully
phrased to limit its holding to the picketing involved, where the picketing was 'directly related in
its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was being put.' " Id. at 563, citing
Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308, 320 n.9 (1968). The Lloyd dissent would have avoided a decision on
the unrelated message issue on the ground that, since Lloyd Center had already been opened to
some first amendment activities, the respondents could not be denied a similar forum or, alterna-
tively, if this question had to be resolved, then the balance between the conflicting interests
"plainly must be struck in favor of speech." Id. at 577-83 (dissenting opinion).
28. Id. at 566 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court observed that in Logan Valley "the
store was located in the center of a large private enclave with the consequence that no other
reasonable opportunities for the pickets to convey their message to their intended audience were
available." Id. at 563. The dissent conversely argued that the "only hope" and "only way [many
persons] can express themselves" is "to speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens
can be found. One such area is the business district of a city or town or its functional equivalent."
Id. at 580-81 (dissenting opinion). The dissent's position suffers from an internal inconsistency: if
the criterion is indeed whether the private forum is the only reasonable situs available, then mere-
ly finding that it is "one such area" is insufficient.
29. The Court noted, for example, that the "business district" functional equivalent of public
property language in Logan Valley was "unnecessary to the decision," 407 U.S. at 562, and that
the " 'open to the public' [argument] would apply to most retail stores and service establishments
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ceeded "naked title" and perhaps even reached constitutional
proportions; 30 curtailed Marsh to its actual company town factual set-
ting, as Justice Black had urged in Logan Valley;3 1 and concluded "that
there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately owned and oper-
ated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise
therein the asserted First Amendment rights. ' 32 The dissenters were
understandably concerned with whether the rationale of Logan Valley
could survive this pervasive frontal attack. 33
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB and Hudgens v. NLRB
The erosion of Logan Valley's underpinnings occasioned by Lloyd
was compounded by a second decision issued that same day, Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB. 34 This dispute involved union organizational
activity on the private parking lot of a large free-standing retail store.
After the organizers had been arrested for refusing to leave the prem-
ises, the union filed unfair labor practice charges which, the NLRB
found and the Eighth Circuit concurred, were meritorious, not by rea-
son of Babcock & Wilcox 35 Labor Act criteria but, rather, as a result of
Logan Valley constitutional principles.
Again, the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Hardware
could have been an easy one; all members of the Court agreed that the
across the country." Id. at 565. In addition, to emphasize the point, Justice Powell directly repu-
diated the "open to the public" rationale:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it for designated purposes. Few would argue that a free-standing store,
with abutting parking space for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely
because the public is invited to shop there. Nor is size alone the controlling factor. The
essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not
change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modem shopping
center.
Id. at 569.
30. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated: "We granted certiorari to consider peti-
tioner's contention that the decision below violates rights of private property protected by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 552-53. "It would be an unwarranted infringement of
property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circum-
stances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." Id. at 567. "ITihe Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights
of all citizens, must be respected and protected." Id. at 570.
31. Id. at 561-62, 569 n.13.
32. Id. at 570.
33. Id. at 571, 584-85 (dissenting opinion).
34. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
35. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1954), the Supreme Court held that an
employer may validly post his property against nonemployees' distribution of union literature if
reasonable efforts by the union, through other available channels of communication, will enable it
to reach the employees with its message, and if the employer's notice or order does not discrimi-
nate against the union by allowing other literature distribution. Id. at 112.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Board should not have applied Logan Valley. The Court majority, 36
however, led as in Lloyd by Justice Powell, once more went further.
Logan Valley's holding was restricted to only that private property
which had "assume[d] to some significant degree the functional attrib-
utes of public property devoted to public use"; permitting access in
other situations was considered to constitute "an unwarranted infringe-
ment of long-settled rights of private property protected by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments." 37
The final demise of Logan Valley occurred four years later in
Hudgens v. NLRB.38 The factual setting there was essentially that of
Logan Valley: union picketing at a shopping center, albeit a shopping
center of a considerably greater size. 39 Hudgens, like Central Hard-
ware, came to the Supreme Court as a result of the threatened arrest of
the pickets, the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and a subse-
quent finding of a violation of the Labor Act predicated, in part, on
constitutional considerations.
The majority of the Court,40 in remanding the case to the NLRB
to be considered solely on statutory criteria, made it "clear now, if it
was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive
the Court's decision in the Lloyd case."' 4' Since there could not be a
first amendment distinction based upon the content of speech, there
could be no differentiation between related and unrelated messages.
Accordingly, "if the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First
Amendment right to enter that shopping center to distribute handbills
concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a
First Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of
advertising their strike."'42 In retrospect, Justice Powell, joined by the
Chief Justice, observed, "[t]he law in this area . . . has been less than
36. The composition of the majority was the same as that in Lloyd with the addition of
Justice Stewart who had previously sided with the proponents of free speech. See note 26 supra.
37. 407 U.S. 547 (emphasis added).
38. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
39. The shopping center involved in Hudgens consisted of a large building with an enclosed
mall housing 60 retail stores surrounded by a parking area which accommodated 2,640
automobiles. Id. at 509.
40. Justice Stewart, who had taken a contrary position until he joined the majority in Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), wrote the majority opinion joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Powell and the Chief Justice also
added a concurring opinion. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, did not agree that
Logan Valley should be "inter[red]." Rather, he argued that Logan Valley could simply be distin-
guished on the dubious ground that the picketing in Hudgens was not "directly related" to the
shopping center because the labor dispute had originated at another location of one of the center's
tenants. Id. at 524-25 (White, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 518.
42. Id. at 520-21.
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER V ROBINS
clear since Logan Valley analogized a shopping center to the 'company
town' in Marsh . ..I now agree with Mr. Justice Black that the opin-
ions in these cases cannot be harmonized in a principled way ...
The Court's opinion today clarifies the confusion engendered by these
cases by accepting Mr. Justice Black's reading of Marsh . ..this clari-
fication of the law is desirable. '43
The Court had thus come full circle from Logan Valley. In a labor
context, a trespassory access dispute was to be resolved by the NLRB
utilizing traditional Babcock & Wilcox standards, 44 while in a similar
nonlabor controversy, the first amendment did not require access to
private property other than in the Marsh "economic anomaly of the
past, 'the company town.' -45 The assumption that the Court had
finally ended its lengthy preoccupation with seeking a constitutional
reconciliation of free speech and private property rights was soon to be
revealed as a false hope. The "desirable clarification" of Hudgens was
transformed into undesirable confusion by PruneYard.
PRUNEYARD'S PRESENT: ONCE MORE INTO THE FRAY
The Diamond v. Bland Decisions
While the forces of private property were slowly slaying the Logan
Valley dragon in the United States Supreme Court, similar battles were
simultaneously occurring at the state level. At first, the state courts
were sharply divided on the issue,46 but following Lloyd, they too ap-
43. Id. at 523-24 (Powell, J., and Burger, C.J., concurring).
44. See note 35 supra. The Labor Act pre-emption issue which had clouded Logan Valley
and Taggart, see notes 12 & 23 supra, was decided by the Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). The Supreme Court there re-
versed a decision of the California Supreme Court which, on preemption grounds, had denied an
injunction prohibiting trespassory union picketing. The Court held that, in effect, the Chief Jus-
tice's position in Taggart, see note 23 supra, was correct, ite., that the Garmon doctrine did not
preclude a state from resolving the trespassory aspects of picketing notwithstanding that such
conduct may have been either arguably prohibited or protected by the Labor Act. The "arguably
prohibited" prong of Garmon was considered inapplicable because of the difference between the
issue that would be resolved by the NLRB and that which would be determined by the state
courts. The Garmon "arguably protected" test was also rejected primarily on the basis that, since
the union could have tested the employer's right to exclude the pickets by filing unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB, its failure to invoke Board jurisdiction could not then be utilized
to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to entertain the employer's trespass action. Id. at 207-08.
Still unresolved, however, was the question whether, assuming the union had promptly filed
charges with the NLRB, the employer could nevertheless obtain an injunction prior to a determi-
nation that the charges lacked merit. Cf. id. at 209 (Blackman, J., concurring) with id. at 213-14
(Powell, J., concurring). See also May Dep't Stores v. Teamsters, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7
(1976), where the Illinois Supreme Court sanctioned the issuance of an injunction against trespas-
sory picketing notwithstanding pending union charges before the NLRB.
45. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561 (1972).
46. Cf., e.g., People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
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peared to recognize the pre-eminence of private property rights.4 7 The
zenith of this triumph took place in California, one of the earliest and
strongest fortresses of trespassory free speech,48 with the second deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court in Diamond v. Bland.49 That
court had previously ruled that there was a constitutional right to circu-
late initiative petitions and to engage in related conduct on private
shopping center premises. The center, as a result, was enjoined in Dia-
mondl from prohibiting the peaceful exercise of such first amendment
activities. 50
In Diamond II, the court upheld the dissolution of that injunction.
The intervening decision in Lloyd was found controlling: the court
(1961) (picketing on the private parking lot of a retail store enjoined); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn.
684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964) (statute prohibiting entering a business or standing outside it for the
purpose of enticing anyone therefrom enforced against picketing on private property); Moreland
Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) (injunction
issued prohibiting picketing on the private property of a shopping center) with, e.g., Schwartz-
Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers', 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1964) (injunction denied on free speech grounds against picketing on the property of a
shopping center); State v. Williams, 37 Labor Cas. 65,708 (Md. Crim. Ct., 1959) (trespass statute
cannot be applied to picketing on a "quasi-public" shopping center); Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (Michigan
Supreme Court divides equally on whether there is a constitutional right to handbill on shopping
center property); State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (per curiam decision that
Logan Valley precludes application of criminal trespass statute to political activity on a shopping
center); and Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1971)
(injunction issued to allow environmental organizations to solicit initiative petition signatures in
shopping centers).
47. See, e.g., Lenrich Assoc. v. Heydra, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972) (plurality opinion
finds Lloyd to be based on the constitutional rights of the property owner and bars Krishna dem-
onstrations on shopping center premises; Lloyd is found "controlling," id. at 129, 504 P.2d at 116);
Homart Dev. Co. v. Fein, 110 R.I. 372, 293 A.2d 493 (1972) (shopping center granted injunction
prohibiting the solicitation on its premises of signatures on a nominating petition; Lloyd is deemed
"dispositive," id. at 374 n. 1, 293 A.2d at 494 n. 1); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 509 P.2d 1095
(1973) (defendants convicted of criminal trespass for engaging in antiwar protests at the private
offices of the Honeywell Corporation; Lloyd is held to "definitively dispose" of the contention that
the trespass statute was unconstitutionally applied, id. at 461, 509 P.2d at 1103); Diamond v.
Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 61 Cal. 2d
766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1967); In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969); Diamond v.
Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
49. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) [herein-
after referred to as DiamondlI]. The first decision in Diamond v. Bland is found at 3 Cal. 3d 653,
477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as
Diamond 11.
50. The decision was predicated upon the reasoning of Logan Valley which, the court con-
cluded, was applicable notwithstanding the availability of other effective sites for the desired first
amendment activities. The shopping center premises involved in Diamond were deemed to be no
different from Union Station in Los Angeles, the private railway station that was held to be a
proper location for the distribution of antiwar leaflets in In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d
353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). In either situation, the Diamond I court concluded, any disruption
could be controlled through "reasonable regulations." 3 Cal. 3d 653, 665, 477 P.2d 733, 741, 91
Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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noted that (1) "as in Lloyd, plaintiffs have alternative, effective chan-
nels of communication"; (2) "their initiative petition bears no particu-
lar relation to the shopping center, its individual stores or patrons"; and
(3) "under the holding of the Lloyd case, the due process clause of the
United States Constitution protects the property interests of the shop-
ping center owner from infringement. . supremacy principles would
prevent us from employing state constitutional provisions to defeat de-
fendant's federal constitutional rights."' 1
The dissent was outraged in much the same manner as the Lloyd
dissenters. Diamond I, the dissent argued, had also been based on an
independent nonfederal ground 52 and, in any event, concerned the cir-
culation of an initiative petition, a constitutionally rooted activity
which was clearly distinguishable from the handbilling in Lloyd.5 3 The
reversal of Diamond I was viewed, therefore, as an abject "surrender"
which "ignore[d] basic guarantees of [the] state Constitution" and dealt
"a serious blow to state sovereignty and to the independence . . . of
this court."'54
51. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 335 & n.4, 521 P.2d 460, 463 & n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 & n.4, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). Here the court relied on the Lloyd language quoted in note 30 supra.
The court expressly left undetermined the issue of whether the California Constitution afforded
broader protection than the first amendment.
52. The independent nonfederal ground, representing the state's freedom "to adopt higher
standards for protection of individual rights than compelled by the federal Constitution," was the
protection afforded by section 9 of Article I of the California Constitution: "Every citizen may
freely speak, write and publish his statements on all subjects. . . and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of free speech or of the press." Id. at 338, 340 n. 1, 521 P.2d at 465,
467 n. 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473, 475 n. I (dissenting opinion). Lloyd was not construed to constitu-
tionally require a different conclusion; instead of being based on fifth and fourteenth amendment
property rights, the dissenters construed that opinion to impose a restriction on first amendment
activities "only under the circumstances there involved" and noted that Lloyd "recognizes that the
size and diversity of activities of a shopping center might warrant a different result in another
context." Id. at 340 n.1, 521 P.2d at 467 n.l, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.l.
This view is also expressed in a criticism of Lenrich Assoc. v. Heydra, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d
112 (1972), a decision which the dissenters refused to follow, which appeared in Note, Freedom of
Speech-Owners' Fifth Amendment Property Rights Prevent a State Constitution from Providing
Broader Free Speech Rights Than Provided by the First Amendment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1592 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Note, 86 HARV. L. REV.]. The validity of the dissent's position was ultimately
upheld in PruneYard. See text accompanying notes 62-70 infra.
53. The dissent thus emphasized the long standing importance of the "full and free exercise
of the right of initiative" in California and the need to permit access on private property for the
circulation of initiative petitions lest the process "become the captive of well-financed special in-
terest groups." II Cal. 3d at 343, 521 P.2d at 469, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (dissenting opinion).
Diamond was thus distinguishable from Lloyd, according to the dissenters, because it sought "to
vindicate a noneconomic right rooted in the Constitution-a right which is an integral part of the
constitutionally created legislative process"; because, in contrast to Lloyd, there were far less alter-
native avenues of communication; and because of the corollary greater need for access in the
initiative petition situation. Id. at 344, 521 P.2d at 469, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
54. Id. at 336, 340, 521 P.2d at 464, 467, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 475.
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PruneYard in the California Courts
Just as a reshaped United States Supreme Court substantially con-
tributed to Logan Valley's reversal in Lloyd and Hudgens, by 1979 the
shifting political sands of California resulted in a reconstituted Califor-
nia Supreme Court."5 In Robins v. PruneYard,56 a four-to-three major-
ity of that court overruled Diamond II. The plaintiffs in PruneYard
were high school students desiring access to a shopping center5 7 for the
purpose of obtaining signatures on a petition opposing a United Na-
tions resolution against "Zionism. ' 58  When such entry was denied,
they sought an injunction against the center and its owner which the
lower California courts, primarily on the basis of Diamond!!, denied.
The California Supreme Court, however, granted the injunction. It
concluded that, although Diamond II "involved facts much like those
of the instant case[,] . . . [it] did not examine the liberty of speech
clauses of the California Constitution . . . [which] protect speech and
petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the
centers are privately owned."'59
Contrary to Diamond II, the PruneYard majority found Lloyd to
raise no supremacy clause bar; that case was considered to be essen-
tially a first amendment decision which "did not purport to define the
nature or scope of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of shopping
center owners generally."' 60 The court was free, therefore, to resurrect
the rationale of Logan Valley which it had advocated in Diamond I,
i.e., that because "central business districts apparently have continued
to yield their functions more and more to suburban [shopping] cen-
ters," such centers provide "an essential and invaluable forum" for the
exercise of constitutional speech and petition rights.6'
55. The majority in PruneYard consisted of Justices Tobriner and Mosk, Governor Pat
Brown appointees, who had been in the majority in Diamond I and in the dissent in Diamond II,
joined by two new Governor Jerry Brown appointees, Justice Newman and Chief Justice Bird.
The dissent consisted of two Governor Reagan appointees, Justices Richardson and Clark, and
Justice Manuel, a Governor Jerry Brown appointee.
56. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
57. The court observed, citing the DiamondII dissent, that "we do not have under considera-
tion the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail
establishment." Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The PruneYard Center "con-
sists of approximately 21 acres--devoted to parking and 16 occupied by walkways, plazas and
buildings that contain 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a cinema." Id. at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 855.
58. The court at the outset indicated that its holding was only "that the soliciting at a shop-
ping center of signaturesfor apetition to the government is an activity protected by the California
Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 902, 903, 910, 592 P.2d at 342, 343, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855, 856, 860.
60. Id. at 903, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
61. Id. at 907, 910, 592 P.2d at 345, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858, 860.
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PruneYard The United States Supreme Court's Affirmance
On appeal, a unanimous United States Supreme Court affirmed. 62
The Court agreed with the California Supreme Court that a state, pur-
suant to its police power, may adopt "reasonable restrictions on private
property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without
just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provi-
sion. ' 63 Thus, although Lloyd and Hudgens had held that mere open-
ness to the public is not a basis for utilizing the first amendment to
"create individual rights in expression beyond those already existing
under applicable law," 64 those cases did not vitiate the authority of the
state to adopt "individual liberties more expansive than those conferred
by the Federal Constitution. '65
The Court found that neither the shopping center owner's fifth
amendment property rights nor his first amendment speech rights con-
stituted a supervening federal constitutional limitation. In the case of
the former, although there had "literally been a 'taking' " of the own-
er's right to exclude others, that "taking" did not rise to the level of an
"unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property rights."' 66
There were essentially three reasons for concluding that the de-
sired petitioning would not impair the value or use of the shopping
center: first, PruneYard could "restrict expressive activity by adopting
time, place and manner regulations that [would]. . .minimize any in-
terference with its commercial functions"; second, the students in-
volved "were orderly"; and third, they had restricted their activities "to
the common areas of the shopping center. '67
62. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). The Court's opinion was
written by Justice Rehnquist. There was a separate concurring opinion by Justice Marshall who
persisted in his view that "Logan Valley was rightly decided, and that both Lloyd and Hudgens
were incorrect interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 90. He also indi-
cated that, while he considered there to be a "sphere of private autonomy which government is
bound to respect ...including rights against trespass, [which could not be abolished] at least
without a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy," id.
at 93-94, these " 'core' common-law rights" were not involved in PruneYard for several reasons:
(1) "[tihe California Supreme Court's decision is limited to shopping centers which are already
open to the general public"; (2) the shopping center is entitled "to impose reasonable restrictions
on expressive activity"; (3) there was "no showing of interference with appellants' normal business
operations"; and (4) there was no "invasion of any personal sanctuary .... No rights of privacy
are implicated." Id. at 94. Justice Blackmun added a statement joining in all but one sentence of
the opinion. See id. at 88-89. Justices White and Powell also added concurring opinions seeking
to limit the scope of the main opinion. See id. at 95. See also text accompanying notes 71-76
infra.
63. Id. at 81.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 82-83.
67. Id. at 83-84. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), was distinguished as
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By sanctioning the PruneYard as a forum for the students' pro-
posed conduct, the state also had not unconstitutionally abridged its
owner's first amendment rights, ie., requiring that he disseminate "an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a man-
ner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public. ' 68 In PruneYard, since the shopping center was freely open to
the public and was not limited to the personal use of its owner, it was
not "likely" that the views of the petitioners would "be identified with
those of the owner"; there was "no specific message. . . dictated by the
State" or "danger of governmental discrimination for or against a par-
ticular message"; and, if desired, the owner was free to post signs or
otherwise disavow any connection with the students' message. 69 There
was, accordingly, no federal constitutional bar to California's recogni-
tion of the petitioners' right to exercise "state protected rights of expres-
sion and petition" on private shopping center property.70
In their concurring opinions, Justices White and Powell carefully
explained why they were willing to agree that there had not been an
unconstitutional infringement of the center owner's property or speech
rights. They noted that only the public or common areas of a large
PruneYard type of "shopping center" were involved, not an "individual
retail establishment within or without" the center or "a homeowner" or
even "large establishments [that] may be able to show that the number
or type of persons wishing to speak on their premises would create a
substantial annoyance to customers that could be eliminated only by
elaborate, expensive and possibly unenforceable time, place and man-
ner restrictions."' 7 1 A different situation might also exist, Justices White
and Powell suggested, if the owner was compelled to "supply a forum
for causes he finds objectionable,' 72 if the customers were "likely to
identify opinions expressed by members of the public on commercial
property as the views of the owner" 73 or if there was "state action that
involving governmental interference with "reasonable investment backed expectations" since in
that case there was a compelled free public use of property which had theretofore been open only
to fee-paying members who had paid such fees, in part, to maintain the "privacy and security" of
their property. Id.
68. Id. at 86-87. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id. at 95 (White & Powell, JJ., concurring).
72. Id. at 98 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). One such situation, Justice Powell inferred by his
citation of Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972), and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox,
351 U.S. 105 (1956), was the right to exclude, where permitted by the Labor Act, undesired union
organizers.
73. Id. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring).
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force[d] individual exposure to third party messages."' 74 In sum, if the
center patrons would be likely to assume that the third party's speech
was that of the property owner, or if the views expressed were "so ob-
jectionable as to require a response even when listeners will not mis-
take their source,"' 75 then there would be substantial federal
constitutional questions raised by state mandated access rules.
In PruneYard, however, these considerations were not present.
The center was a vast area of which the petitioning students occupied
only a small corner, thereby negating any inference that their views
were those of the center owner; there was no allegation that the owner
disagreed with the petitioners' views or that their message was so inher-
ently "objectionable as to require a response"; and there was "no evi-
dence concerning the number of types of interest groups that may seek
access to this shopping center." 76
PRUNEYARD'S FUTURE: UNCERTAIN WATERS
While there is considerable uncertainty as to the future metes and
bounds of PruneYard, the decision represents more than an isolated
California phenomenon. All but six states have a constitutional free
speech clause resembling that incorporated in the California Constitu-
tion, with only Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
Vermont and South Carolina retaining a short clause such as that
found in the Federal Constitution.77 In addition, statutory speech
and/or petition protection probably will be enacted in various states.
For example, a bill passed the Illinois Senate 78 in 1979, expressly sanc-
tioning political campaign literature distribution on the premises of pri-
vate shopping centers. A similar proposal, which would have
precluded any business open to the public from excluding either polit-
ical candidates or those "seeking signatures from members of the pub-
lic," was introduced this year in the Rhode Island House.79 The
anomolous result is that, although the Federal Constitution does "not
prevent the property owner from excluding those who would demon-
strate or communicate on his property, '80 the various states will likely
74. Id. at 100 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 101 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Z. Chafee, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 5 n.2 (1967).
78. S. 104, 81st Gen. Assy. (1979).
79. 80, R.I. Gen. Assy., 1980, reported in the PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN (Feb. 1,
1980).
80. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 95 (1980). 100 U.S. at 2048 (White,
J., concurring).
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now each impose their own variety of such limitations on property
rights.
Does this mean, as Justice White inquired in PruneYard, that a
state may require a private property owner "to subsidize any and all
political, religious or social action groups by furnishing a convenient
place for them to urge their views on the public and to solicit funds
from likely prospects?""' One answer, of course, is that the states will
themselves no doubt each arrive at different restrictions; some activities
may be tolerated in one state, more conduct sanctioned in another
state, and in still a third state, the federal Lloyd-Hudgens approach may
prevail with the property owner having the right to bar all distribution
or solicitation on his property. Apart from this inherent lack of uni-
formity, if the history recited above provides any guide, the dimensions
of such restrictions may also be dependent on the political composition
of state legislatures and courts.
Finally, in addition to these vagaries, the more perplexing inquiry
is whether, as Justice White responded to his own question, "there are
some limits on state authority to impose such requirements. ' 82 Any
such limitations would primarily have to be concentrated in four areas:
(1) the nature of the private property involved; (2) the conduct of those
seeking to engage in the particular expressive activity; (3) the nature of
the message at issue; and (4) the "reasonableness" of the property own-
er's time, place and manner regulations. An examination of the limita-
tions that are likely to ensue in each of these areas, however, discloses
only minimal hope for the property owner.
Nature of the Property Involved
Justices White and Powell, as noted above, would limit
PruneYard's applicability to only the common areas of large shopping
centers, thereby prohibiting the states from extending speech activities
into either other areas of a center or to smaller centers, single establish-
ments or private homes. 83 Post-PruneYard litigation does not necessar-
ily suggest this narrow interpretation. California courts, for example,
have applied PruneYard to permit at least limited access to private resi-
dential communities.84 Moreover, it is difficult to perceive how the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. There is similarly limiting language contained in the California Supreme Court's opin-
ion, see note 57 supra, and Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in PruneYard, see note 62 supra.
84. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden West Publishing Corp., 80 Daily Journal D.A.R.
2513 (Cal. C.A. 4th, Sept. 4, 1980), discussed at note 17 supra.
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PruneYard views of Justices White and Powell can be reconciled with
their own position in Lloyd that "there are differences only of degree-
not of principle-between a free-standing store and one located in a
shopping center, between a small store and a large one, between a sin-
gle store with some malls and open areas designed to attract customers
and Lloyd Center with its elaborate malls and interior landscaping." 85
The close similarity of the language used by the California
Supreme Court in PruneYard and that contained in Logan Valley also
cannot be ignored; if the objective is to insure that "businesses situated
in the suburbs" may not "immunize themselves from criticism" and
speech activities on their premises any differently than "[bjusiness en-
terprises located in downtown areas . . . [that are] subject to on-the-
spot public criticism for their practices," 86 then the commercial prop-
erty distinctions87 advocated by Justices White and Powell would ap-
pear to be inconsequential.
Conduct of Those Engaging in Expressive Activities
There is no dispute that the conduct of those engaged in the ex-
pressive activity must be "peaceful and orderly."' 88 Both the California
Supreme Court and Justice Rehnquist stressed that they were not
countenancing physical obstruction of ingress or egress to an establish-
ment or any other interference with the normal operations of a busi-
ness. 89 In practice, however, this limitation will probably afford no
greater protection to the property owner than the normal restrictions
that apply to picketing, ie., that the expressive activity cannot be pro-
hibited but, instead, may only be limited with respect to numbers or
place or conduct, in order to provide that it is peaceful. 90 Since the
rationale is to protect against the likelihood of violence, "the exception
85. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 565-66 (1972).
86. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324-25 (1968).
87. The rights of homeowners and noncommercial property owners are, as both Justice Pow-
ell in PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 100 n.4, and Justice Marshall, id. at 93, observed, of a different order
and may be immune from state-mandated intrusion by virtue of personal privacy rights. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also note 17 supra. A similar distinction in a com-
mercial property situation could also be made, regardless of the size of the establishment, where
the activity occurs "in the entrance area of a store or in the lobby of a private building,"
(Prune Yard, 447 at 99) (Powell, J., concurring) or in the interior of a store, see note 23 supra, on
the ground that these locations too greatly interfere with normal business operations. A distinc-
tion predicated solely on the size of an establishment or whether it is part of a shopping center is,
however, suspect for the reasons set forth in the text. See note 100 infra.
88. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980).
89. Id. at 83.
90. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 308 n.2
(1968); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
208-09 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also note 16 supra.
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is only as broad as its justification .. . A blanket injunction against all
picketing. . . will be sustained only if the consequences of violent and
peaceful conduct are not separable." 9'
From the standpoint of the property owner, however, even peace-
ful and orderly solicitation, petitioning or other free speech activity on
private property inherently constitutes an interference with normal
business operations. The property owner is still required to provide,
free of charge, commercial facilities to be utilized in a manner that will
distract or even drive away those very customers he has attracted, fre-
quently through the expenditure of considerable money and effort, to
its premises. 92 The objective of the desired activity, after all, is to entice
patrons to devote their limited shopping time and even their monies to
a variety of competing uses. Additionally, the property owner must
also exercise "semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the
State" 93-to provide, for example, the requisite maintenance and secur-
ity services and to assume the risk of any potential disruption or dam-
age liability. The contrary assumption of PruneYard that, regardless of
this substantial and expensive burden, "[tihere is nothing to suggest
that preventing [property owners] . . . from prohibiting this sort of ac-
tivity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property," is
91. Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity,
83 HARV. L. REV. 552, 560 (1970). There is an added practical difficulty. An injunction limiting
the number of persons involved or the place of the expressive activity will normally not issue
unless "actual violence was a recurring or imminently threatening condition . . . [rather than
merely] peaceful activity which shows no signs of presently becoming violent and which does not
physically interfere with the employer's operations or others' access to his place of business." Id.
at 565-66. Those engaging in obstructive or violent speech thus have two bites at the apple. Un-
less the prohibited conduct is recurring, the property owner will probably not be able to obtain an
injunction and, even thereafter, assuming that the misconduct still continues, there will be an
order to show cause issued and little likelihood of contempt if the unprotected activity then ceases.
By that time the property owner may either have suffered irreparable injury or, assuming that
police resources are unavailable, which is a substantial concern because of a reluctance of the
police to act in light of Prune Yard, resorted to self-help with its concomitant risk of a tort suit or,
in a union context, an unfair labor practice charge.
92. The public frequents a commercial facility because of the investment that has been made
by that facility to gain and retain patronage. Customers doing business with a shopping center
have been led to believe, for example, that the center is a comfortable and convenient place to
shop. This objective may entail, of course, various noncommercial promotional activity "to create
'customer motivation' as well as customer goodwill in the community." An auditorium may be
made available to groups, such as the Cancer Society and Boy and Girl Scouts, free of charge;
American Legion poppy distribution and Salvation Army charitable solicitation may be tolerated;
prominent political candidates may be allowed to speak at the center; and other similar conduct
may be sanctioned in the belief that these activities will "bring a great many people to ... [the]
Center who may shop before they leave." This type of conduct, however, cannot be equated with
other undesired behavior which the property owner wants to preclude because it is "considered
likely to annoy customers, to create litter, potentially to create disorders, and generally to be in-
compatible with the purpose of the Center and the atmosphere sought to be preserved." Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1972).
93. Id. at 569. See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
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surely questionable. 94
Nature of the Message at Issue
It has also been argued that PruneYard "carries a number of sig-
nals to warn that the result is narrowly based. The emphasis on 'police
power' and 'economic impact' is not accidental. ' 95 For example, since
the fifth amendment language of PruneYard is pegged to the absence of
any interference with "reasonable investment backed expectations,"
and its first amendment conclusions are tied to the absence of both a
government prescribed message and any evidence that the PruneYard
owner or patrons objected to the ideas contained in the students' peti-
tions, it is presumed that highly objectionable union picketing, which is
clearly designed to interfere with the business of a particular establish-
ment, would "obviously" dictate a different result. 96 No such differ-
ence in result, in fact, has occurred.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters,97 following the Supreme Court's remand, the California
Supreme Court again refused to enjoin the union picketing at issue. It
did so on the basis of a subsequently enacted state statute98 which de-
clared that peaceful union activity on private property was "an excep-
tion to the [California] criminal trespass statutes" which must be found
to be a "lawful activity." 99 As in the case of PruneYard, the court
found Lloyd and Hudgens inapplicable because "they did not involve a
constitutionally protected right of property at all."' ° The United
94. 447 U.S. at 83. Both the California Supreme Court in PruneYard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 905-07,
592 P.2d 341, 344-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857-58 (1979), and the Solicitor General, Brief as amicus
curiae at 19-20, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), similarly stressed that
the PruneYard obligation was essentially no different from that imposed by zoning, rent control,
environmental laws and other governmental restrictions on the use of private property. This view
was predicated upon the mistaken assumption that "the impairment of the owner's interest must
be largely theoretical," 23 Cal. 3d at 905-07, 592 P.2d at 344-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58, and that
while "[olne may speculate that the Center's maintenance and security costs might be slightly
increased or that a slight decrease in sales might result . . . to the extent any such impact may
exist..." it is not significant. Solicitor General's brief at 18-19.
95. Taylor, Prune Yard" No AccessforAnti-Business Picketing?, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., July
21, 1980.
96. Id. See 447 U.S. at 83, 87, 100-01 (Powell, J., concurring).
97. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). See note 44 supra.
98. CAL. CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 527.3 (1979), known as the Moscone Act. The court, accord-
iigly, did not have to address the applicability of the PruneYard constitutional rationale. 25 Cal.
3d 317, 327 n.5, 599 P.2d 676, 683 n.5, 158 Cal. Rptr. 370, 377 n.5 (1979).
99. Id. at 323, 599 P.2d at 680, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
100. Id. at 331, 599 P.2d at 686, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 380. The court, in finding that "Sears can
assert no claim based upon the federal Constitution, statutes, or cases which would require the
California courts to enjoin the picketing in the present case," also disposed of the contention that
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States Supreme Court subquently declined review.' 0'
The implications of Sears are plain: "no matter how controversial,
offensive, distracting or extensive"' 0 2 the expressive conduct may be,
unless it exceeds the limited bounds of peacefulness described above or
transgresses "reasonable regulations," the states are free to mandate ac-
cess. Permissible free speech messages are not to be confined to their
governmental petitioning roots of Diamond I and PruneYard.0 3 Such
a result is also consistent with PruneYard. Nothing in Justice Rehn-
quist's discussion of property rights would warrant an interpretation
that the requisite unconstitutional "taking" should turn on the content
of the speech at issue. The property owner's first amendment rights
would similarly not be predicated on such a distinction. Expressive
conduct that is directed at protesting the behavior of a particular estab-
lishment is clearly less, rather than more, likely to be identified with
that establishment or to be viewed as a government decreed opinion.
Indeed, it would be an ironic twist to Hudgens' interment of Logan Val-
ley, based on a refusal to differentiate between speech, 04 if such a dif-
ference were now to be resurrected to allow the communication of
unrelated, but not related, messages.
It is similarly difficult to perceive how, if protest conduct is to be
allowed, other free speech activities should be precluded merely be-
cause, although they are not even directed at the property owner, he
nevertheless deems the views expressed to be objectionable. If it had
been shown, for example, that the owner of PruneYard Center was a
supporter of the PLO and was adamantly opposed to Zionism, should
Sears should be distinguished from PruneYard because the former only involved a single free-
standing store:
[Tihe sidewalk outside a retail store has become the traditional and accepted place where
unions may, by peaceful picketing, present to the public their views respecting a labor
dispute with that store. Recognized as lawful by the decisions of this court, such picket-
ing likewise finds statutory sanction in the Moscone Act, and enjoys protection from
injunction by the terms of that act. In such context the location of the store whether it is
on the main street of the downtown section of the metropolitan area, in a suburban
shopping center or in a parking lot, does not make any difference. Peaceful picketing
outside the store, involving neither fraud, violence, breach of the peace, nor interference
with access or egress, is not subject to the injunction jurisdiction of the courts.
Id. at 332-33, 599 P.2d at 687, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
101. 100 U.S. 3038 (1980). The petition for certiorari had sought review on the basis of an
alleged violation of fifth amendment property rights, on the ground that the Moscone Act was
preempted because it impermissibly frustrated the implementation of the Labor Act and on the
theory that the state law, by withholding any remedy as well as precluding employer self-help
against unprotected union activity on private property, constituted a denial of procedural due
process.
102. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564 n.ll (1972).
103. See notes 52 & 53 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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tie result really have been any different? A property owner would be
precluded from engaging in any content discrimination by Babcock &
Wilcox ' 0 5 in a Labor Act setting and by Lloyd in a first amendment
situation. 06 State differentiation between free speech activities would
similarly be given careful equal protection scrutiny. 107 PruneYard, it is
submitted, requires the same conclusion. Where a particular determi-
nation can pass equal protection muster, a state presumably is free to
make its own decision as to whether access to private property should
be granted for such diverse activities as religious proselytization, 0 8
union picketing or organizational activities, the solicitation of funds,
political campaigning, competing commercial activities' 0 9 and public
assemblies.
Reasonableness of Regulations
In PruneYard, the reliance placed by the California Supreme
Court"10 and Justice Rehnquist"' upon the ability of "reasonable"
time, place and manner regulations to negate any interference is also
illusory. There is patently no consensus as to the appropriate time, 1 2
location," 3 number of individuals or exhibits involved,' 14 manner of
105. See note 35 supra.
106. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1972). See also id. at 577-79 (dissenting
opinion).
107. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). See also Note, 86 HARV. L. REV., supra note 52, at 1600 n.40.
108. Proselytization by the Krishna and other similar groups is presently being litigated before
various lower courts in California. One difficulty that property owners have encountered is the
position taken by local District Attorneys, viz., as stated by the Riverside (Ca.) County District
Attorney in a June 25, 1980 letter to the law enforcement agencies in his jurisdiction, "as long as
religious zealots do not grab, touch, yell into the individual faces of, or block the individual paths
of particular stores, but merely shout their message of religion to the people in general, they are
not in violation of [the criminal trespass statute]."
109. As one court recently noted, "[clommercial solicitation has traditionally been accorded
less protection than has political or religious solicitation." Connecticut Citizens Action Group v.
Town of Southington, 508 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1980). In that case, however, the court invali-
dated a local ordinance that confined door-to-door solicitation to the hours between 8:00 a.m. and
6:00 p.m. on the ground, inter alia, "that the ordinance treats one form of commercial speech less
restrictively than it treats any form of political speech" (emphasis the court's). Id. at 2312.
110. See 23 Cal. 3d 899, 909, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979).
I11. 447 U.S. at 83.
112. Some regulations preclude expressive activity during peak hours; others confine such ac-
tivity only to any time that the establishment involved is open for business. Some regulations also
limit the duration of any particular activity, e.g., a one or two consecutive day or a "no more than
five hours in any two days" restriction while others have no such limitation. Some, but not all, of
the regulations additionally prohibit more than one activity from occuring simultaneously.
113. Many regulations provide that the owner may designate a particular area in which the
desired activity is permitted, a designation that will necessarily vary, of course, from establishment
to establishment. In addition, some regulations expressly confine certain activities, such as peti-
tioning or soliciting, to a particular number of feet from a table.
114. The number of individuals permitted by different regulations ranges from two to six per-
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representation," 5 security factors, 116 type of activity permitted" 7 or
other considerations" 18 that any such regulations would have to deline-
ate. The provision for "reasonable regulations," accordingly, only
promises to be a harbinger of litigation.'9
Moreover, contrary to the view of some observers, the burden of
promulgating and enforcing regulations cannot be dismissed as insig-
nificant. 120 Even before PruneYard, one shopping center owner esti-
mated that he received an average of three requests each week, for each
of his seventeen centers, to use his premises for nonbusiness related
expressive activity.' 2 1 With such volume, the cost of assuming the
state's responsibility to determine and enforce the appropriate time,
place and manner restrictions, in addition to the attendant maintenance
and security expense, the risk of any potential disruption or damage
and the concomitant loss of business, 22 is substantial. "The problem
of creating 'reasonable regulations' for each case," as the California
Court of Appeal observed in Diamond I, "assumes epic proportions
...[and causes] policing problems of staggering proportions."'' 23
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, through a painful evolution from Logan Val-
ley to Hudgens, finally concluded that equating a private store or shop-
sons. There are also often elaborate limitations on the exhibits that may be used, e.g., a require-
ment that posters to be utilized "may not exceed 15 inches along any dimension," and even
requirements that any exhibits cannot be used without prior approval.
115. For example, various regulations forbid certain types of dress; the use of microphones,
other noise emitting devices, additional lighting or displays having moving parts that could cause
injury; the vending or peddling of merchandise, books or periodicals; the solicitation of funds; the
creation of safety or litter hazards; the use of electrical or mechanical equipment; and a multitude
of other restrictions.
116. Most regulations require some form of security deposit, which may or may not be refund-
able, that may vary from $50 to $250. The regulations also frequently provide that the user must
first execute a hold harmless agreement and shall be responsible for cleaning up any garbage or
debris occasioned by his activity.
117. Some regulations have adopted an express "political petitioning" limitation that may ei-
ther be defined or left to the "good faith" of the property manager. Many regulations also provide
-that a disclaimer by the establishment is to be posted at the location of the expressive activity.
118. For example, some regulations are translated into Spanish, others provide that "a respon-
sible adult individual ...expressly accepts full responsibility," some require a waiting period
between the time of the permit application and the desired activity, certain regulations provide
that the user must obtain insurance, and there are many other variables as well.
119. Cf., e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970), and Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
120. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REV., supra note 52, at 1603-04.
121. Briefof Homart Dev. Co. as amicus curiae at 2-3, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
122. See notes 92 & 94 supra and accompanying text.
123. 8 Cal. App. 3d 58, 74, 87 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1970).
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ping center to a company town or public market place improperly
creates an overwhelming burden of regulation for the private property
owner, with private concerns, as contrasted with a public body with
responsibility over public areas. The PruneYard decision now permits
the states to once again place that burden on the private property own-
er. It is an opinion which could have, if other states follow the lead of
California, a significant impact on the long-term development of com-
mercial establishments. 24 It is also an opinion which has the unfortu-
nate result of imposing upon private property rights, as stated by the
dissent in the California Supreme Court, "varying and shifting inter-
pretations of state constitutional [and even statutory] law for their safe-
guard and survival."'' 25
The reason for this substantial imposition upon property rights-
the belief on the part of the California Supreme Court that shopping
centers and other private property "provide an essential and invaluable
forum for exercising . .. [speech and petitioning] rights"' 26-is also
open to doubt. The economic development of shopping centers, after
all, has not occurred in a vacuum. The communication of a message,
which many years ago in a less technological era of face-to-face contact
may have been largely restricted to the public market place, is clearly
no longer so inhibited. Today, there are radio and television, newspa-
pers, telephones, numerous public forums and an endless variety of
other alternative media of expression apart from the use of private
property. The principle for state courts and legislatures to bear in mind
is that they must accommodate speech and property rights "with as
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other,"'127 not create laws which "wholly disregar[d] the constitutional
basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country."' 128
124. For example, while vertical shopping centers, as exemplified by Water Tower Place in
Chicago, may not be totally exempt from Prune Yard's coverage, if that case creates costly reper-
cussions, shopping center developers may in the future stress vertical, as opposed to horizontal,
centers. Cf. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1981) (permitted union
picketing on the 46th floor of an office building). In any event, the rental fees of participating
stores will inevitably be increased to cover the added cost of security protection and the enforce-
ment of "reasonable" regulations. Prune Yard's suggestion that a fee paying arrangement by users
of a center might cause a different result, see 447 U.S. at 84, may also encourage adoption of such
measures. Such customer-imposed fees would, of course, have a corollary adverse effect on the
future development and use of shopping centers.
125. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 912, 592 P.2d 341, 348, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861(1979) (dissenting opinion).
126. Id. at 347.
127. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co:, 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1954).
128. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517 (1976), quoting Food Employees Local 590 v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332-33 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).

